Legal scholars usually analyze copyright as an incentive and sometime obstacle to creation. This encourages us to see publishers as middlemen who siphon off rents that would be better spent on authors. By comparison, recent social science research emphasizes that word-of-mouth markets are highly imperfect. This means that many deserving titles will never find readers unless some publisher takes the trouble to market them. But this second view is deeply subversive. After all, the need for publishers -and reward -does not end when a book is published. At least in principle, copyright should last forever. The trouble with this argument is that it assumes what ought to be proven. How much effort do publishers really invest in finding forgotten titles? And does vigorous marketing attract more readers than high copyright prices deter? This article looks for answers in the history of 20 th Century print publishing and today's Print-on-Demand and eBook markets. We argue that, far from promoting dissemination, copyright frequently operates to suppress works that would otherwise erode the price of new titles. This pathology has gotten dramatically worse in the Age of eBooks. Meanwhile, public domain publishers are facing their own crisis. Mid-20 th Century books had large up-front costs. This deterred copyists. By comparison, digital technologies make it easy for copyists to enter the market. This has suppressed profits to the point where many public domain publishers spend little or nothing on forgotten titles. The article concludes by reviewing possible reforms. Partial solutions include clarifying antitrust law so that firms have more freedom to implement price discrimination; modifying copyright so that consumers can re-sell used eBooks; letting on-line markets limit the number of publishers allowed to post redundant public domain titles on their sites; and strengthening non-commercial institutions for finding, curating, and delivering quality titles to readers.
Legal scholars usually analyze copyright as an incentive and sometime obstacle to creation. This perspective invites us to see publishers as middlemen who siphon off rents that would be better spent on authors. The trouble with this view is that it is mostly theoretical: By most accounts few authors (and fewer legal scholars) earn any significant royalties at all. 1 But in that case, why have copyright in the first place? If we follow the money, the only possible answer must be: "To fund publishers." For this justification to work, however, we must first be satisfied that publishers perform some socially useful function.
Recent scholarship provides an intriguing rationale. Word-of-mouth literary markets, it turns out, are extraordinarily fickle. Without intelligent intervention, many deserving and even excellent titles will be lost forever. 2 The good news is that * © Stephen Maurer 2015. Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, smaurer@berkeley.edu. I thank the Sloan Foundation for its generous support and the Institute for Advanced Studies at Toulouse for hosting me at their "The Economics of Intellectual Property, Software and the Internet" Conference on January 8 -9, 2015. I am especially grateful to Jacques Cremer, Sara Ellison, Sonja Garden, Alex Karapetian, Mike Katz, John Kay, Megan MacGarvie, Petra Moser, Toby Mundy, Patrick Rey, Pam Samuelson, and Paul Seabright for their helpful comments. Any errors are mine alone. My deepest thanks to the late Suzanne Scotchmer, who first encouraged me to take up this line of research and -among many insights -pointed out the link between books and durable goods monopolies. This is for you. 1 Complaints that author rewards are miniscule go back to Roman times. See, e.g. Martial Epigrammata 2.36 (complaining that author's wallet "doesn't notice" royalty payments). For more recent evidence, see, e.g., John Eggan, The Truth About Book Royalties (June 2, 2009) (only one in a thousand authors who contacts a literary agent earns more than "symbolic" income). Available at http://ezinearticles.com/?The-Truth-About-Book-Royalties&id=2424907; see also, Tom Shippey, Steering by Starlight, WSJ (Aug. 2 2014) ("In the 1950s there were only about five authors who made a living from sci fi without needing a day job and only one of them made a good living") and Peter DiCola, "Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians' Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives," Arizona Law Review 55: 301-343 (2013) (survey reporting that average US musician earned twelve percent of her revenue from copyright-related sources.); but see Megan MacGarvie and Petra Moser, "Copyright and the Profitability of Authorship: Evidence from Payments to Writers in the Romantic Period," NBER Working Paper (July 31, 2013) (arguing that early 19 th Century authors earned at least £84 per title at a time when laborers earned £15 per year); see also, George Orwell, Tribune (London), "As I Please," (March 3 1944) (arguing that 19 th Century literary markets were unusually lucrative.). Available at http://www.telelib.com/authors/O/OrwellGeorge/essay/tribune/AsIPlease19440303.html. at pp. 500-501. The arbitrariness of literary markets was already known to the Romans. Martial, Epigrammata 3.38 (noting that only a few authors have managed to "push their way among the great" this randomness disappears for titles that start off with a substantial number of readers. It follows that publisher efforts to find and advertise worthwhile titles make markets more efficient. 3 Yet this view is deeply subversive. After all, the need to find and market titles does not end with publication. For some books, at least, the need for copyright might last forever. 4 Theory can only take us so far. This article asks (a) how often publishers have actually found and promoted forgotten titles in the past and (b) whether their marketing efforts attract readers faster than the price of copyrighted books deters them. We proceed as follows. Section II introduces the book market in miniature by examining the shelves of a typical Barnes & Noble "superstore." This is already sufficient to show that copyright gives publishers powerful reasons to suppress older titles. We also argue that older works appear on store shelves far less often than quality would dictate. Section III argues that finding and marketing forgotten classics is inexpensive and provides good value for money. Sections IV through VI ask how much effort commercial publishers actually put into finding and marketing older titles in the 20 th and early 21 st Centuries. We argue that publisher incentives to suppress copyrighted titles have gotten worse in the age of eBooks while public domain publishers' ability to find and market titles have nearly collapsed. Sections VII and VIII review possible solutions including (a) reforming antitrust law so that firms have more freedom to implement effective price discrimination strategies, (b) letting Amazon and other on-line platforms restrict the number of publishers who are allowed to sell the same public domain title, (c) reforming copyright so that consumers are allowed to re-sell used eBooks, and (d) strengthening public domain institutions for finding and marketing forgotten books. Section IX presents a brief conclusion.
II. A TRIP TO THE SUPERSTORE
The modern book market is so vast that it is hard to develop useful policy intuitions. This section introduces the problem in miniature by studying the roughly and that the rest are "pale from hunger"); see generally, George Haven Putnam, Authors and Their Public in Ancient Times, p. 250 (Cooper Square Publishers, 3rd ed. rev. 1966) (1893) (" [M] artial refers more than once to many amiable and deserving authors who, despite their talents, succeeded in reaching no public at all…"). 3 The argument is presented at length in Stephen M. Maurer, "From Bards to Search Engines," supra note 3. 4 The idea of perpetual copyright was famously championed by the late Sonny Bono. Wikipedia, "Mary Bono" Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Bono. Bono may or may not have known that English printers had advocated a similar idea in the debates that led to the Statute of Anne The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 525 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics 5,500 "Fiction and Literature" titles found in a typical brick-and-mortar superstore. 5 Table 1 summarizes this data. 
A. Age
The first thing to notice is that the average title is remarkably recent. Indeed, more than half of the books in our sample were published in the last decade 7 and only one-fifth (21%) were published before 1980. Restricting the sample to former bestsellers tells a similar story: While Barnes & Noble stocks nearly all Number One annual bestsellers published since 1990, 8 the figure falls to sixty percent for the Seventies and Eighties before leveling out at around twenty percent for the half century between 1920 and 1969. 9 There are almost no titles before that. 10 5 All data in this section are based on the author's inspection of one hundred randomly selected 'Fiction and Literature' titles available for sale at Barnes & Noble's El Cerrito, California superstore. (Last visited October 24, 2014). 6 Goodreads, "Books That Everyone Should Read at Least Once" (2008) . Available at http://www.goodreads.com/list/show/264.Books_That_Everyone_Should_Read_At_Least_Once. 7 The figure is even greater when one considers that current bestsellers are shelved elsewhere in the store. 8 Wikipedia, Publishers Weekly lists of bestselling novels in the United States, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publishers_Weekly_list_of_bestselling_novels_in_the_United_States_in_ the_2000s. Only two titles are missing: The fundamentalist Christian novel Desecration (2000) and Scarlett (1993) The most natural way to interpret this data is to assume that book quality depends both on age and inherent literary quality. 11 While most books quickly drop from sight, some titles possess enough literary merit to justify fresh editions for the millions of readers who come of age each year. At this point the title never goes out of print and becomes a classic. 12 
B. Price
The second surprise in Table 1 concerns price. Most modern fiction is sold in luxurious "trade paperback" formats. 13 The fact that 55% of our titles are priced in the narrow band between $14.99 and $16.00 suggests that publishers possess excellent price discipline. This is still more impressive when we recall that the $14.99 figure includes a two-thirds (67%) markup over each book's estimated $9.00 manufacturing and distribution cost. 14 The high prices are presumably stabilized by some combination of industry concentration 15 The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 527 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics Table 1 shows that this phenomenon also holds for older books: Prices are remarkably stable for titles published since 1995 and decline only slightly going back to the 1970s. While the discounts for pre-1955 titles are steeper, this difference is more apparent than real since the cheapest copies are usually low-quality "mass paperback" formats that deliver less value for money.
C. Suppressing Older Books
The high price and recentness of titles are so striking that it is natural to suspect a connection. We start with a puzzle. Given current production and distribution costs, it would be easy to sell old titles for, say, ten dollars and still earn a profit. Indeed, many consumers would prefer to buy less topical titles in exchange for a cash discount. Authors and heirs should be similarly willing to earn lower royalties from titles that are currently out-of-print. So why doesn't it happen? Plainly, the answer must lie with publishers. Unlike readers and authors, they much prefer selling high margin new books -In the language of business, offering low-priced alternative titles would "cannibalize" their business. 17 More formally, economists have known since the 1970s that monopolists can often earn higher profits by suppressing cheap, low quality versions of their products. 18 If society gives publishers the power to suppress old titles, we should expect them to use it.
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This insight is very different from the usual assumption in American case law 20 and scholarship 21 that IP owners will never suppress their property. While the "Stability in Competition," Economic Journal 39: 41-57 (1929) . Send the average reader to a modern big box store and she will be lucky to find even one title she likes. The fact that the store offers 100,000 alternatives is essentially irrelevant. 17 The argument implicitly assumes that there is some fixed limit to the number of books consumers are prepared to buy each year. 18 shortage of old titles has been noticed before, 22 it was ascribed to superficial causes like case law that forced publishers to renegotiate royalty agreements or changes in tax law. 23 This encouraged us to hope that minor, ad hoc reforms could fix the problem. The case looks very different once we realize that suppression is part and parcel of profit maximization. Assuming that it can be fixed at all, reform will require major changes to copyright and antitrust law.
There is a deep irony here. Suppression would not pay if each publisher owned one and only one title. Instead, the trouble arises because real publishers manage portfolios. Normally this is a good thing. I have argued elsewhere 24 that copyright's greatest innovation was that it let publishers spread risk across titles that were too unpredictable to invest in individually. But now we find that portfolio investing also encourages publishers to make other, older titles disappear.
D. Price Discrimination
The competition between old and new titles is less acute where publishers find ways to price discriminate, i.e. charge different readers different prices for identical texts. For most of the 20 th Century, publishers issued new titles in luxurious hardcover editions followed by cheap "mass market" paperbacks a year later. Because high-end consumers wanted their favorites early and in hardcover, paperbacks boosted profit with little downside. Since the 1980s, however, mass market formats have given way to "trade paper," "print on demand" and most recently "eBook" formats. We argue below that each successive technology has changed publishers' willingness to tolerate older titles.
E. The Role of Literary Elites
So far we have assumed that book markets consist entirely of publishers and readers. In fact, mid-20 th Century copyright supported a vast ecosystem of actors including bookstores, public and commercial libraries, university scholars, high school teachers, literary agents, 25 professional reviewers, 26 and movie studios. Like publishers, all of these players made a living by persuading readers to try unfamiliar titles. How successful were they? At the level of my local superstore, the only obvious 22 the market is improved. If readers do not like the recommendation, the book will sink harmlessly into obscurity.
F. The Value of Memory
Most book sales data are proprietary. We use rare 2012 data to benchmark the relative sales of classic and average titles among 150 Top-Selling Paperbacks. 35 Even more than in our superstore survey, the titles are incredibly recent: Indeed, the median entry is just two years old 36 with more than two-thirds of all titles (69%) published in the past five years. At the same time, classic titles continue to matter: Books published more than forty years ago still account for roughly one-tenth (9%) of all sales. 37 This durability implies an outsized importance to readers. The average Top-Selling Paperback on our 2012 list can expect to sell about one million copies over its lifetime. 38 By comparison, most classics sell 100 -150,000 copies year in and year out. 39 Assuming that classic status lasts a century, we expect these works to serve at least 10-15 times more readers than ordinary titles. 40 35 Publishers Weekly, "The Highs and Lows in Paperbacks: Facts & Figures 2012," supra at note 32. The list provides sales data for 148 top-selling titles. 36 Id. I exclude the Fifty Shades of Grey series which sold more copies than the Harry Potter books and at one point accounted for one-fifth of all US fiction sales. These sales almost certainly include a large fraction of purchasers who do not normally participate in the book market. See Business Insider: "By the Numbers: the '50 Shades of Grey' Phenomenon" (n.d.). Available at http://www.businessinsider.com/by-the-numbers-the-50-shades-of-grey-phenomenon-2012-6#a-hrefhttphostedaporgdynamicstoriesuusbooksfiftyshadescomicconsiteapampsectionhomeamptemplat edefault16-milliona-copies-of-the-50sog-series-have-been-sold-so-far-in-the-us-1. 37 The 40 One might think that future sales should be discounted. However, this runs into the impossibility of comparing one consumer's utility against another. Reader A can indeed trade present enjoyment for interest income that will allow more consumption in the future. The same this logic does not apply when we try to compare her enjoyment against that of the still-unborn Reader B. This suggests that we should treat present and future readers identically. The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 531 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics In fact, even this estimate is low. Economists have known since the 1890s that prices are determined at the margin, i.e. by the last copy sold. This means that relatively useless commodities (e.g. diamonds) often command higher prices than those (e.g. drinkable water) we care about. 41 If books were less plentiful, it is a safe bet that Hemingway and Fitzgerald would command more market share than they do today. The final column of Table 1 makes this point explicit by comparing current Barnes & Noble store shelves against a consumer poll of 1,000 "Books that People Ought to Read." 42 Finally, classics offer important externalities. While most people enjoy discussing books with friends, 43 better titles surely increase the fun. Classic titles also show aspiring authors how to write. As Hemingway tells us, "the good writer competes only with the dead." 44
G. How Well Are We Doing?
The question remains how well today's book industry searches for and markets older titles. Here, the obvious problem is that we cannot be sure how many quality titles have yet to be discovered. Fortunately, we can estimate this. Suppose that a recognized expert mounts an intense search into some narrow subject like "mothers" or "loneliness." No matter how large the literary universe, 45 a sufficiently narrow search will always be exhaustive and can reliably turn up many if not most of the best titles. 46 As it happens, the Wall Street Journal's "Five Best" column invites a different expert to do this every week. I randomly selected twenty columns containing 99 separate titles. 47 Confirming our earlier results, the average book was much older than those shelved at my local superstore: The median publication date was 1992 and twelve of the titles preceded the 1923 copyright cutoff. 48 Even assuming that the experts 41 Wikipedia, "Paradox of Value," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_value. 42 Goodreads, "Books That Everyone Should Read at Least Once (2008) . Available at http://www.goodreads.com/list/show/264.Books_That_Everyone_Should_Read_At_Least_Once. 43 For a recent argument stressing the importance of network effects in publishing, see Anita Elbourse, Blockbusters (2013). 46 This is the same strategy that astronomers use to estimate undiscovered objects. If an exceptionally long photographic exposure turns up seven asteroids, the fact that three were previously unknown goes a long way toward measuring our ignorance. See Bruce L. Gary, "Asteroid Hunting." Available at http://brucegary.net/AsteroidHunting/x.htm. 47 The sample included columns from 2011-2015. One title appeared twice. 48 I had previously read four titles and heard of seven more. These were heavily biased toward topics I follow and have occasionally looked for university libraries.
[14:521 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 532 deliberately emphasize obscure titles, 49 the titles they do find are excellent. 50 This strongly suggests that population of forgotten masterpieces is both large and valuable. 51 This evidence that older titles have been systematically forgotten should not surprise us. After all, publishing is full of anecdotes about the discovery of forgotten books including many titles now taught in freshman "Great Books" courses. 52 Given that so many famous titles have barely escaped oblivion, it seems overwhelmingly likely that many equally deserving titles have yet to be discovered.
III. SEARCH COSTS
Our discussion so far suggests that copyright suppresses older titles. Even so, reform will be pointless if finding forgotten titles turns out to be hopelessly expensive. This section reviews the available search strategies and argues that the required effort is actually quite modest.
A. Available Search Methods
Most 'forgotten' titles have already accumulated extensive metadata. Publishers can use this information to economize on search costs.
Current Sales
The first and simplest way to remember old titles is to keep selling them. In this inertial memory case, good titles are stored in the same way that people repeat an unfamiliar telephone number until they can write it down. 53 For most of the 20 th 49 I saw no evidence of this. 50 I have followed the column's recommendations a half-dozen times over the years and can confirm its excellence. "Six million books, it is said, perished in the blitz of 1940, including a thousand irreplaceable titles. Most of them were probably no loss, but it is dismaying to find how many standard works are now completely out of print…About a year ago I had to do a broadcast on Jack London. When I started to collect the material I found that those of his books that I most wanted had vanished so completely that even the London Library could not produce them…And this seems to me a disaster, for [14:521 2015] The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 533 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics Century the US replaced about twenty percent of its readers every decade. 54 This naively meant that any title whose first edition sold more than five times its minimum feasible print run could be republished every ten years. 55 The good news in the Digital Age is that print runs are affordable down to a dozen so copies per year. 56 Naively, this keeps them available for rediscovery them if and when tastes change.
The trouble, as we have seen, is that real literary markets are inefficient. This means that titles that sell a handful of copies each year are overwhelmingly likely to die out unless some publisher intervenes.
Human Memory and Metadata
Inertial memory apart, the cheapest way for publishers to identify forgotten titles is to harvest instances where other humans have already read the book and formed a judgment. Publishers and sales representatives routinely ask readers, authors, and other book people for remembered favorites. This human memory can persist for generations. 57 The second strategy is to search old metadata including historic sales figures, 58 publisher reputation, 59 genre, short summaries, literary and newspaper reviews, the author's literary 60 or non-literary 61 fame, and whether the book was Jack London is one of those borderline writers whose works might be forgotten altogether unless somebody takes the trouble to revive them. Even The Iron Heel was distinctly a rarity for some years, and was only reprinted because Hitler's rise to power made it topical…" 60 Our "Five Best" sample contains seventeen unknown -to me at least -titles by authors I had already heard of. This suggests that author names are an excellent search proxy. Some publishers build whole business strategies around finding and publishing once-famous authors. Home Page, Reinkarnation Books, http://reinkarnationbooks.com/ ("We source authors who were once commissioned and fêted in their time but whose books are now out-of-print and hard to find. Their work deserves to be given a new lease of life.") 61 Our "Five Best" sample contains nine titles by authors whose names I already knew on nonliterary grounds.
[14:521 2015] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 534 successful in foreign markets. 62 The rise of search engines and machine intelligence should make these data still easier to exploit in the future.
Brute Force Search
The most expensive way to find forgotten books titles is brute force search, i.e. pulling books off shelves and reading them. This work is mostly done by editors and literary agents 63 and is the unavoidable last step once metadata and human memory have identified promising titles.
B. Total Effort
It is only prudent to ask how a wise social planner would deploy these tools and what it would cost. We start by noticing that valuable books can be divided into two distinct categories each of which requires a slightly different search method. 64 
Fixing Past Mistakes
We have already said that many deserving books have never received a fair hearing. But how often should we revisit these titles? Hemingway's dictum teaches that living writers should compete with the dead. If this were all, we would expect publishers to revisit old titles as often as new ones -a truly backbreaking prospect.
In fact the situation is not nearly so bad. First, the number of titles published in 1950 was thirty times smaller than it is today. 65 This implies less volume to search through. Second, the Hemingway argument ignores topicality. This means that metadata searches can quickly eliminate categories like temperance novels or spiritualist screeds. More sophisticated cuts can probably reduce the number of candidates by an order of magnitude. Finally, there is information in the fact that older titles have been rejected once already. Suppose that editors mistakenly overlook 20% of all deserving books the first time around. Then a second (and comparably faulty) search should drive the error rate to 5% and a third search to just over one percent. This suggests that publishers should revisit older titles far less often than new ones. 
Accommodating Changing Tastes
As Orwell reminds us, titles that were correctly rejected in the past can sometimes gain value when recent events make them more topical or readers become more sophisticated. The good news is that these changes usually happen on generational time scales so that it is sufficient to revisit titles every twenty years or so. The bad news is that decades of copyright suppression have encouraged publishers to let their records of older titles atrophy. 66 Like highway overpasses, this neglected infrastructure will require large one-time repair costs.
C. Knowing When to Quit
However self-congratulatory, Hemingway's dictum that the good writer should compete with the dead sounds like the correct economic prescription. At the same time, search should stop when the cost of wading through thousands of awful books exceeds any likely benefit to consumers. Marketing should similarly stop once a forgotten title gets a fair hearing from market.
Commercial institutions respect these limits automatically. We expect profitmaximizing publishers to fund whichever searches promise the highest quality titles for a given effort. Total effort, in turn, is defined by the copyright reward. In principle this limit does not apply to voluntary collaborations like Gutenberg that operate outside the market. That said, they depend on a very small subset of the reading public for labor. This suggests that any danger of oversupply is mostly theoretical.
The case is fundamentally different for taxpayer-funded programs. These have no natural upper limit and can easily overinvest. Carefully designed programs should normally include explicit tests (e.g. numbers of downloaded copies) to avoid this problem.
IV. MEMORY IN THE PRINT ERA
Theory can only take us so far. This section looks at how often traditional print publishers remembered and rediscovered Twenties titles from 1930 to 1990.
A. Business Models
Twentieth Century publishing included two very different industries. Publishers that specialized in copyrighted texts had little to fear from pirates and focused on extracting maximum profit from their portfolios. By comparison, public domain publishers knew that lucrative titles would eventually attract competing editions that 66 My admittedly anecdotal experience with copyright permissions suggests that publishers often have no idea who owns 1970s-era books. put a ceiling on profits. Despite this, self-help methods gave them a quasi-monopoly up to about twice their typesetting costs.
Copyrighted Titles
We have argued that copyright encourages publishers to suppress old titles. The good news, for much of the 20 th Century, was that markets can mitigate this effect. Starting in the Thirties, publishers discovered powerful price discrimination strategies in which luxurious, high-margin first editions were followed by cheap "mass market" paperbacks a year or so later. 67 This protected new book margins while extracting large revenues from consumers who would never have bought the original hardback. 68 Crucially, the system aligned the publishers' private interest in making money with readers' desire for access. The more publishers segregated the market, the more readers benefited.
Public Domain Titles
Mid-century public domain publishers relied on print technology's large up-front costs to deter copyists. To see how, consider a publisher who brings back a forgotten title. At first, she receives 100% of all sales. But this changes abruptly once expected revenues are large enough for a second publisher to launch its own edition. At this point the original publisher can expect to lose half its market share along with a sharply eroded markup. Revenues then start to grow again until a third (fourth, fifth…) publisher repeats the process.
In practice, this sawtooth pattern was probably blurred by publishers' imperfect knowledge of demand. 69 Even so, public domain publishers could safely expect to 67 The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 537 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics recover about twice their upfront costs on average. In an age where typesetting was expensive, this provided a generous margin for search and marketing investments. Clever business tactics could increase these advantages still further:
Specialized Manufacturing Technologies. Niche publishers optimized their presses for short print runs. 70 This suppressed competition from conventional printers and permitted an additional markup. 71 Distribution Networks. Niche publishers built private sales channels that sold to libraries, special interest customers, and enthusiasts. 72 These captive audiences found it easier to pay modest markups than to comparison shop elsewhere.
Quality and Repeat Business. Publishers that sold enough books to expect repeat business could charge a premium for quality. 73 The main drawback of these methods was that older titles almost always had smaller print runs. This implied high unit costs that kept the price of revived titles similar to new ones. 74 This was a deep handicap for rediscovered titles trying to rebuild an audience.
B. Remembering Bestsellers
We have argued that contemporary publishers have good reason to suppress titles. By comparison, cannibalization risk seems to have been much manageable before the 1980s. After all, if cheap paperbacks adequately protected new titles, republishing older titles was a fortiori safe. I used the exhaustive Worldcat database 75 
'Top Ten' Bestsellers
I started by reconstructing the history of all 93 "Top Ten Bestsellers" from 1918 to 1927. 76 Since Worldcat does not record how long individual editions remain in print, I added the arbitrary-but-reasonable assumption that a title is "forgotten" when it goes ten years without a new edition. 77 (Changing this interval by a few years does not qualitatively change our insights.) By this measure sixteen percent of our titles have stayed in print ever since they were published, 78 i.e. persisted through "inertial memory." Conversely, most of our bestsellers (56 titles) were forgotten by the end of the 1930s and fully eighty percent (73 books) by 1950. 79 But this was not the end of the story. Instead, forgotten titles could be rediscovered and sometimes even achieved inertial memory:
1940s. Ten "forgotten" titles (10%) were rediscovered in the 1940s. 80 Of these three were immediately forgotten for the rest of the 20 th Century, 81 five were 76 The sample contains just 93 books because some titles appeared as bestsellers in more than one year. Fifty-four of these are now in the public domain. The slight preponderance of public domain over copyrighted titles reflects the fact that some post-1923 bestsellers were originally published before the cutoff date. Additionally, two bestsellers -The Plastic Age (1924) (1949) . I have excluded two additional examples which were only "forgotten" according to our definition for a year or two. These went on to enjoy inertial memory for the rest of the 20 th Century. The Green Hat (1936, 1947, 1968, 1983, 1991) ; Lost Ecstasy (1933, 1955, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1986, 1998 [ 82 and one remained in print for the rest of the century. 83
1950s. Five "forgotten" titles (5%) were rediscovered in the 1950s. 84 Of these one was immediately forgotten, 85 two were sporadically reprinted, 86 and one remained in print for the rest of the century. 87 1960s. Two "forgotten" titles (2%) were rediscovered in the 1960s. 88 Both were sporadically reprinted later in the century. 89
1970s. Much of our sample entered the public domain in this decade. Among those that did not, two titles (5%) were rediscovered. 90 Though was promptly forgotten, the other was continuously reprinted for the rest of the century. 91
1980s. One title (3%) of those still in copyright was rediscovered in this decade. 92 It remained in print for the rest of the century. 93 Overall, the chances that publishers would bring back a copyrighted bestseller were about three percent per title per decade. 94 82 Valley of the Silent Men (1976), A Good Woman (1955, 1957, 1971 ), River's End (1957, 1976) , Mistress Wilding (1963, 1976) , Dangerous Days (1966 Days ( , 1972 . 83 The UP Trail (1956, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1995) . Including our two marginally forgotten titles would increase the total to three. The Green Hat (1957, 1968, 1969, 1983, 1991) and Lost Ecstasy (1955, 1966, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1986, 1998) . 84 The Breaking Point (1950), Call of the Canyon (1950, 1952, 1953) , The Homemaker (1952), The Keeper of Bees (1952 Bees ( , 1958 , and The Perennial Bachelor (1953) . 85 The Perennial Bachelor. 86 The Homemaker (1983, 1999) , The Keeper of Bees (1961, 1969, 1976, 1991) , and The Breaking Point (1966, 1970) . 87 Call of the Canyon (1966 Canyon ( , 1975 Canyon ( , 1986 Canyon ( , 1988 Canyon ( , 1992 Canyon ( , 1995 (1966, 1978) , which was forgotten for just two years according to our definition. 91 Enchanted April (1986, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 1996, 1997 [
Public Domain Titles
The end of copyright 95 triggered an all-time high of nine rediscoveries (17%). 96 Six of these were published a year or two after copyright expired. 97 Two-thirds of these quickly disappeared 98 but three titles were regularly reprinted until the end of the century. 99 Rediscoveries fell back to three editions (6%) in the 1980s. 100 Neither was reprinted for the rest of the century. Within the limits of our small sample, these numbers were comparable to the rediscovery rate for copyrighted titles. This confirms our intuition that cheap paperback formats were a powerful strategy for managing cannibalization risk and that high typesetting costs were the main impediment to rediscovery in the classical era. The fact that three of the revived public domain titles went on to achieve something like inertial memory is particularly impressive.
C. Remembering Mid-List Titles
The WorldCat database does not stop with bestsellers. This section tracks 100 randomly-selected midlist titles published from 1918 to 1927. 101 Because libraries try to please patrons the list almost certainly reflects more popular titles than a truly random selection would. This is most visible in the presence of two bestsellers 102 and a relatively large fraction (25%) of big name publisher titles. 103 Despite this, most of the sample is reliably obscure and includes many small American (26%) 104 Daughter (1976) . This was probably designed to preempt demand for a few more years.
98 Greatheart (1978 Greatheart ( , 1980 ) is a partial exception. 99 Desert of Wheat (1982, 1985, 1991) , Dawn (1987 Dawn ( , 1995 , and The Great Impersonation (1978, 1985, 1986) . 100 The Plastic Age (1980), The Brimming Cup (1987) and Oh, Money! Money! (1989). 101 The WorldCat site does not perform searches if the title field is left blank. I avoided this limit by inserting the words "a novel" -a dummy phrase that appears in hundreds of titles -in the space provided. I then arrived at the sample by generating a chronological report for each year in my date range and discarding titles that had been published at least once in earlier years. 102 Unlike bestsellers, only five midlist titles were still remembered by the end of the Thirties. 106 Thereafter, there were six rediscoveries in the 1940s 107 before the pattern settled down to one or two rediscoveries per decade through the 1980s. 108 However, almost all of these texts had originally been issued by big publishers at the popular end of our sample. 109 This left just two small press rediscoveries for the entire 20 th Century:
Hope's Highway (1919, 1973, 1994) was an early race relations novel 110 that was rediscovered by a university professor and republished by small press AMS while still in copyright. This may have influenced Big Six publisher MacMillan to bring out its own edition in 1994. 114 While Cope never found a big name publisher, it still commands more sales than most midlist titles. 115 Based on this sample, the odds against small press titles being rediscovered were less than one percent per decade. This would not have surprised our midlist authors. Small presses almost never bothered to renew their copyrights. 116 The fact that both of our resurrected books address hot button social issues suggests that only the most extreme social changes could make midlist titles topical again. Even Feminism was insufficient: Apart from Hope's Highway, only one (3%) of the thirty female-authored titles in our midlist sample was republished after the 1940s. 117 Finally, none of our midlist titles was revived because of changing literary tastes, although this clearly happened on occasion. 118 
V. THE DIGITAL ERA: PRINT-ON-DEMAND AND EBOOKS
Price discrimination strategies built on cheap "mass market" paperbacks unraveled in the 1990s. This increased cannibalization risk and made copyright suppression more attractive. Meanwhile, revolutionary print-on-demand ("PoD") technologies slashed print run sizes. The combined effect of these developments was that publishers rediscovered more titles than ever before -but only in the public domain.
A. Changing Production and Distribution Methods
Digital publishing methods slashed publishers' fixed costs. For the first time since the invention of printing, profits no longer depended on publishers' ability to market and predict sales. At the same time, new actors challenged publishers' control over hardcover prices, eroding price discrimination. Publishers responded by shifting from cheap paperbacks to high margin "trade paper" formats that were close substitutes for 114 Joel Conarroe, Seven Types of Ambiguity New York Times (Aug. 9 1998), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/09/books/seven-types-of-ambiguity.html. 115 The Barnes & Noble search site listed fourteen paper and ten eBook editions for Cope, far more than most of its midlist peers. 116 All of the large publishing house titles in our sample were renewed. Among small publishers, only June of the Hills (Junaluska Woman's Club) and Don Coyote (International Fiction Library) were renewed.
117 That Which Hath Wings (1967) . The exact number is hard to estimate since some women ("Richard Dehan") wrote under male pseudonyms. Virago, which specializes in rediscovering female authors, hardly ever dips beneath the level of former best-sellers and first-tier authors. Readers can find a complete list of Virago titles at http://www.virago.co.uk/books/.
118 Probably the most prominent example was the Seventies revival of "pulp" fiction crime and horror stories. Philip Herrera, Books: "The Dream Lurker," Time (June 11 1973) (satirizing H.P. Lovecraft revival); Anon., "Books: Back to the Gore of Yore, Time (July 5 1971) (describing Doc Savage revival). The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 543 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics hardbacks. This increased cannibalization risk so that copyright suppression became much more attractive.
Digital Production
The invention of desktop publishing in the 1980s made print runs profitable down to a few thousand copies. 119 By the 1990s, PoD technologies had cut minimum batch sizes to fifty and sometimes single copies 120 so that fixed costs were negligible. 121 This meant that publishers' profitability no longer depended on predicting sales: Search and marketing were now essentially optional. Many PoD publishers 122 responded by issuing large, indiscriminate catalogs 123 that dumped the search task onto readers. What marketing did exist focused on narrow targets like the author's friends, 124 enthusiast networks, 125 and libraries. 126 At the same time, PoD lacked scale economies. This meant that traditional methods remained cheaper above 1,000 copies. The net result was that PoD titles were systematically more expensive and less well-marketed than print. This produced a deeply segmented market. As of 2009, the average PoD title sold just 200 copies 128 and only one in twenty PoD titles overlapped the 1,000 copy boundary where print became cheaper. 129 This made it hard for rediscovered titles to attract significant readerships, let alone achieve inertial memory.
Shared Production
Digitization meant that titles only needed to be typeset once. This encouraged public domain publishers to use (and sometimes improve) the Gutenberg Project's base texts. 130 But mobilizing unpaid volunteers is difficult. 131 This almost certainly meant that eTexts were undersupplied. 132 Some PoD publishers tried to fill the gap by donating revenue back to the collaboration. 133 
New Distribution Channels
Big box stores like Barnes & Noble began forcing publishers to slash new bestseller prices in the 1990s. 134 This made price discrimination -and the original rationale for cheap paperbacks -pointless. Not surprisingly, publishers reacted by turning to luxurious "trade paper" editions that earned high margins but also increased cannibalization risk. This made copyright suppression attractive. The rise of (2009) . Available at http://www.fonerbooks.com/pod.htm. Price comparisons are particularly fraught since PoD editions often had more quality issues than typeset volumes.
128 Victoria Strauss, "Sales Statistics," supra at note 125 (reporting data from leading PoD players Xlibris, iUniverse, Authorhouse, and Lulu.com). 129 Id. The total number of PoD books on the market was nevertheless impressive. The largest PoD firm, Lightning Source reportedly turned out 500,000 books per month. Chris Holifield, "Print on Demand," Writers Services (n.d.) available at http://writersservices.com/resources/print-demandinside-publishing. 130 PoD publishers could also produce books from scanned Google Book images. However, these usually contained so many errors that quality publishers preferred to make their own scans. Hardpress Manager Darren Scott (personal communication; Nov. 25 2014).
131 Gutenberg volunteers act from various motives including making digital copies for their own personal use, rescuing books that deserve wider audiences, and pursuing an ideological commitment to the public domain. See generally, Project Gutenberg, "Volunteer's Voices" available at http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Gutenberg:Volunteers%27_Voices. On-line searches show that many volunteers are librarians and university employees who, one assumes, work on company time. 132 The penalty was partly offset by Gutenberg volunteers' comparative advantage in finding physical copies and tapping human memory. Project Gutenberg, "Volunteer's Voices" available at http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Gutenberg:Volunteers%27_Voices.
(Volunteers haunt used bookstores, yard sales, friends, and even "elderly neighbors who wanted to lend me favorite books they have saved"). 133 Tredition Classics, "Literature Projects" (Tredition uses Gutenberg texts for 15,000 of its 100,000 titles and returns 15% of its profits to the project). Available at http://www.tredition.com/projects. 134 Traditional print technologies had limited publishers' ability to bring back older titles regardless of copyright status. PoD broke this barrier -but only for public domain titles. Because of suppression, copyrighted books remained as scarce as ever.
Copyrighted Titles
The PoD revolution had almost no impact on our copyrighted bestsellers. Indeed, the number of remembered titles rose by just two percent between 1990 and 2014. 139 The average price of these titles was $17.39 and the lowest $14.25 -firmly within the range for new trade paperbacks. While the era's most familiar titles were sometimes available at significantly lower prices, 140 this made it harder for more obscure titles 137 I identified print-on-demand publishers using Lara Seven Phillips, "A List of Print-on-Demand Publishers, Self-Publishing/"Vanity Presses" and Other Non-Traditional Publishers for Librarians and Authors," Scholarly Open Access available at http://scholarlyoa.com/2014/04/08/a-list-of-print-ondemand-publishers-self-publishingvanity-presses-and-other-non-traditional-publishers-forlibrarians-and-authors/ and Anon., University of Virginia at Wise, Print on Demand Titles (Feb. 14 2014), available at http://people.uvawise.edu/acv6d/CatalogManuals/ComplexCatl/POD_notes.pdf. Some publishers alternate between PoD and conventional print technologies depending on anticipated demand. See, e.g., Wikipedia, "Wildside Press," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wildside_Press; Don LePan, Dec. 31 2014 (Broadview does PoD but will do print runs of down to 50 copies for books expected to sell 20-30 copies per year).
138 I identified small presses by examining publisher home pages, and, in a few cases, contacting individual presses by e-mail. 139 Lost Ecstasy moved from the "remembered" to "forgotten" column while The Silver Spoon was rediscovered. 140 The lowest prices were for Arrowsmith ($7.95), Elmer Gantry ($8.95), Enchanted April ($5.60) and Wanderer of the Wasteland ($6.99).
[
Public Domain Titles
PoD's impact on public domain books was transformative: The number of remembered bestsellers exploded from 17 titles in 1990 to all 54 titles in our sample as of 2014. The downside was massive duplication. Our Barnes & Noble data show that the average former bestseller had 11.8 competing editions while the average midlist title had -despite much lower sales -4.3. 141 This restricted publishers' ability to fund search and marketing and probably explains why most rediscovered midlist titles belong to the popular, big publisher end of our sample. 142 Formally, readers had never had so much choice. However the actual benefits were limited. Because of topicality, most readers need a cash discount to try older titles. This condition was weakly satisfied for PoD editions of former bestsellers, which sold for an average price of $20.74 143 but almost always had cheap copies available below the $14.99 price point for new bestsellers. 144 The average lowest price for midlist titles, on the other hand, was 16.06. 145 For these titles, PoD availability was probably more constructive than actual.
C. The Rise of eBooks
The Digital Revolution climaxed with the rise of eBooks. Naively, one might have expected cheap, easily copied texts to revolutionize availability. In fact, the benefits were mostly confined to public domain titles while copyright suppression got worse.
Technology and Economics
The modern eBook era opened with the launch of Amazon's Kindle in 2007. 146 Six years later eBooks had exploded to just under one-third (27%) of all titles. 147 Then, just as abruptly, growth stopped. 148 Today, eBooks are just one of many formats. 141 Extreme examples included Poor White (16 publishers), Patchwork (11); Bertram Cope's Year (10), Guns of the Gods (8), All the Brothers Were Valiant (6) and The Loyalist (6).
142 All but one of the re-discovered titles had originally been released by publishers who had placed at least one title on the era's Top Ten Bestseller lists. The sole exception, Patchwork, was a regional title describing Pennsylvania's Amish community. 143 Amazon's Createspace subsidiary was particularly aggressive in offering low priced editions. 144 The average lowest available price for former bestsellers in our sample was $8.67. All but two titles (Sonia, Greatheart) had editions priced below $16.00. The blockbuster Age of Innocence was the only title with an average price ($15.43) under $16.00. 145 The average figure concealed substantial variability ranging from $3.99 (Patchwork) to $25.88 (The Big Heart).
146 Joel Waldfogel and Imke Reimers, "Storming the Gatekeepers: Digital Disintermediation in the Market for Books," supra at p. The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 547 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics Strikingly, they colonize the same niche that cheap paperbacks once occupied. 149 This is a broad hint that publishers could restore significant price discrimination if Big Box stores ever lose control of hardback prices.
Copyrighted Titles
I used Barnes & Noble's on-line marketplace to reconstruct eBook prices and availability since the mid-2000s. As of October 2014, only about one-third (31%) of the copyrighted bestsellers in our sample were available as eBooks, 150 slightly fewer than the number available as PoD titles. 151 The picture was similar for midlist titles, just one of which was available as an eBook, 152 compared to two in PoD editions. 153 It is natural to ask whether this suppression is tied to price. On average, publishers charged $5.68 for the copyrighted eBooks in our sample. 154 Adjusting for lower manufacturing costs, this implied roughly the same margin as a $12.00 trade paper edition 155 compared to the $14.99 benchmark price for new titles. This suggests that publishers were making almost no effort to price discriminate. 156 Like mass market paperbacks, eBooks are cheap to make: Scholars estimate that the average manufacturing cost is about $2.00 per copy compared to $7.00 for trade paper. Joel Waldfogel and Imke Reimers, "Storming the Gatekeepers: Digital Disintermediation in the Market for Books," supra at p. 6. eBooks demand is also disproportionately focused on throwaway genres like light fiction and mysteries. Julie Bosman, "The Dog-Eared Paperback," supra at n. 135 (noting similarities between eBooks and mass market paper); Michael Cader, "Real Data on Print Sales in the eBook Era, supra at n. 149 (reporting selected sales data). That said, there are also significant differences. Consumers probably find eReader screens easier to read than the tiny, smudged typefaces that characterized older paperbacks. More importantly, modern book piracy implies that strategies in which publishers wait nearly a year to release downmarket editions lose too many readers to be realistic. 
Public Domain Titles
On the face of things, the picture for public domain titles is more encouraging. Not only is every public domain bestseller available as a commercial eBook, but eBooks appeared sooner than copyrighted titles. 157 By 2014, publishers were offering an average of 14.2 competing editions for each public domain bestseller 158 and the number was growing rapidly. 159 The resulting competition drove down prices so that the great majority of titles were available in 99₵-editions 160 -the lowest price allowed on Barnes & Noble's website. 161 The proliferation of nearly-identical editions probably did not bother platforms like Amazon. From their standpoint, it hardly mattered whether their 30% royalty was paid by one publisher or fifty. 162 But the proliferation of nearly-identical titles practically guaranteed that 99₵ publishers would earn little or no economic profit. The situation was only slightly better for publishers that controlled private sales networks 163 , possessed a reputation for quality 164 or found particularly interesting titles. 165 These typically commonly charged up to $2.99 for titles. 166 More generally, thin industry margins led to a variety of editing and marketing problems: 157 The average first publication date for copyrighted bestsellers is 2010.9. The corresponding figure for public domain bestsellers is 2008.8. 158 For copyrighted bestsellers, the Barnes & Noble site identifies an average of 1.5 publishers per title.
159 Eighty-three percent of all titles had seen at least one new edition in the previous nine months and all titles had undergone at least one new edition since 2011. Extreme examples included The Age of Innocence (110 editions), Main Street (43), Babbitt (42), The Sea Hawk (34) and The Mysterious Rider (33). 160 The bargain edition emerged six months after the first edition on average. In many cases the bargain edition was the first edition. Terms," available at http://cpbarnesandnoble.kb.net/kb/?articleid=4259&source=article&cid=28. 162 The statement assumes that the 99₵ floor accurately reflects the profit-maximizing (monopoly) price. 163 Many publishers sell books by directing readers who come from their web page to Amazon. Questions About Book Sales, FONER BOOKS (2013), available at http://www.fonerbooks.com/q_sales.htm Any market power in this case is presumably controlled by the publisher. 164 For example, Floating Press sells much of their content to Overdrive which was, until recently, a monopoly supplier of ebooks to libraries. David Vinjamuri,"Why Public Libraries Matter: And How They Can Do More," Forbes.com Available at http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml. Libraries license books instead of buying them: Overdrive, 3M, and Baker and Taylor are current platforms). 165 See, e.g. Floating Press Editor Simon Wilson (personal communication; Oct. 10, 2014) ("We do endeavour to pick the best of the texts that are available to us. The original plan was to work through the 'Western canon,' but we also get happily sidetracked on digging up the less influential but still fascinating works out there.") 166 Quality ePublisher Floating Press charged $3.49 for its 2014 edition of It Pays to Smile.
) Become Classics
Search. Commercial eBook publishers published every available Gutenberg title while finding and digitizing almost none of their own. 167 This made them little more than a conduit for titles chosen and digitized by Gutenberg volunteers.
Availability. While Gutenberg made a concerted effort to digitize bestsellers, 168 its overall coverage was thin. Even though 81 of our midlist books have entered the public domain, only 11 (14%) are available as eBooks 169 compared to 30 (63%) in PoD. 170 Quality Assurance. Most editions make little or no effort to fix Gutenberg's many typos and formatting errors, 171 although some quality publishers do a better job. 172 Splitting quality assurance across multiple texts is also wasteful. Physically, at least, it would make more sense to focus industry effort on a single shared eText.
Marketing. Even high margin eBook publishers seem to do relatively little marketing. 173 While platforms like Amazon theoretically have an incentive 167 Since eBooks hardly ever list their source texts-in many cases the publisher does not even list its own name -the case for copying is necessarily inferential. That said, the evidence is overwhelming. I found 37 instances in which WorldCat listed eBooks for bestseller or midlist titles in our sample. In ninety percent of these cases the first commercial edition was published after the first Gutenberg text, usually by just a year or two. 175 Meanwhile, the proliferation of duplicative titles complicates search making it nearly impossible for consumers to judge quality or comparison shop. 176 VI. MARKETING EFFORT So far we have concentrated on publishers' efforts to find forgotten titles. But this effort means nothing unless the titles actually reach readers. For very inefficient markets one can imagine situations where copyright-funded marketing attracts more readers than high markups deter. Does this happen in life?
Consider first the very simple case where consumers have identical taste and differ only in their appetite for reading. Then a socially efficient system should invest resources so that the best book has the largest readership, the second-best book has the second-largest, and so on. 177 This suggests an empirical test: In a well-designed system, on-line book polls should find that titles with more reader reviews 178 also have 174 In principle, Amazon should invest one dollar of marketing every time it promises to generate 1 ÷ 30% = $3.34 in new sales. 175 Amazon didn't seem to know what it was doing. "There are certain things it takes to be a publisher," the head of one New York house said . . . "We care more than they do. Bezos has moved on to diapers and jewelry-we're still doing books." A former Amazon employee who worked in the Kindle division said that few of his colleagues in Seattle had a real interest in books: "You never heard people say, 'Hey, what are you reading?' Everyone there is so engineering-oriented. They don't know how to talk to novelists." . . . "Book publishing is a very human business, and Amazon is driven by algorithms and scale," Sargent told me. When a house gets behind a new book, "well over two hundred people are pushing your book all over the place, handing it to people, talking about it . . . That's pretty hard to replicate in Amazon's publishing world, where they have hundreds of thousands of titles." Id. 176 The market defect seems evident from the fact that publishers often post multiple prices for the same edition on the same day. These sometimes vary by several dollars. Vendors are presumably trying to catch readers who find comparison-shopping prohibitively difficult. 177 The fact that consumers have a limited appetite for books introduces a further complication. Suppose that each title in a series has exactly the same quality. Then we expect bored readers to rate the first title they read higher than the second, the second higher than the third, and so on. This could mimic our optimality signal if readers consume titles in the same order, for instance by original publication date or abundance on store shelves. 178 We assume that the number of reviews scales with the number of readers. This proxy differs from the usual approach of trying to infer the number of book purchases from Amazon sales rank. obscure titles. Cowboy author Zane Grey 183 provides a half-step in this direction. 184 Once again, the lesson is broadly similar: While public domain titles account for just one-third (29%) of Grey's output, they receive nearly two-thirds (65%) of all reviews. The average perceived quality is also higher -3.74 stars compared to 3.57 for copyrighted works.
Ideally, we would like to repeat the test for authors who never wrote a single bestseller. 185 Naively, this ought to be easy: The eBook revolution, after all, has republished plenty of forgotten authors. The trouble is copyright suppression: The rediscovered authors completely disappear after 1923. 186 
VII. REFORMS (A): COPYRIGHTED TITLES
We have argued that copyright operates to suppress older titles and that this pathology has only gotten worse in the Age of eBooks. This section considers how antitrust and copyright law can address the problem.
A. Antitrust Interventions
Copyright gives publishers the power to suppress unauthorized competitors. But legal rights only matter when they are monetized. The task of antitrust is to specify which business strategies are and are not legal. 187 
Divestiture
We have argued that copyright suppression exists because the Big Five publishers who dominate today's bestseller lists also control older titles. Forcing the Big Five to 183 See GOODREADS, "Popular Zane Grey Books," https://www.goodreads.com/shelf/show/zanegrey (last accessed Aug. 29, 2014) (on file with author) I excluded a small number of titles devoted to travel, sports, and other subjects outside Gray's usual Western focus but included titles set in Grey's own time, most notably his pre-WWI novel The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 555 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics divest their backlists to reprint houses would immediately fix the problem. The trouble is finding a legal predicate: Prosecutors would have to show that the Big Five acquired their portfolios through a Section One conspiracy or one of the narrowly-defined unilateral behaviors barred by Section Two. This seems unlikely.
Empowering Price Discrimination
The eBook format has handed publishers their most powerful price discrimination lever in decades. Given the academic consensus that price discrimination makes markets and intellectual property more efficient, 188 judges should normally permit whatever "ancillary restraints" are needed to segment the market. 189 While publishers are unlikely to replicate their Thirties-era successes, even modest price discrimination would be well worth having.
The difficulty is that book prices are contested: Publishers want high eBook prices to protect hardback sales, Amazon wants low prices to promote tablets, 190 and brickand-mortar stores want cheap hardbacks. At least in principle, antitrust doctrine should steer control to whichever party can implement price discrimination most effectively so that more readers receive access.
The issue has already been joined. Two years ago US v. Apple, Inc. 191 held that the Big Five had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to destroy Amazon's control over eBook prices. Their motive, predictably, was to eliminate the "wretched" $9.99 price that was "eating into sales of their more profitable hardcover books" 192 Since no publisher had the clout to challenge Amazon individually, 193 they enlisted Apple to help them. 194 The Court analyzed the case as a straightforward conspiracy to fix prices. But a close look at its findings shows that the Amazon and the publishers were really fighting about who would set prices. So long as Amazon held this power prices would be low. Conversely, each publisher would immediately use control to raise prices even if the market was perfectly competitive. 195 The question remained which arrangement would be best for society. Maddeningly, the Court refused to say, acknowledging only that both market structures were potentially legal 196 so long as they emerged from "regular market forces." 197 
Rationalizing Antitrust Law
The Court's reticence does not provide much guidance. The basic point seems to be that the publishers should not have enlisted Apple's help in the first place. 198 But in that case the publishers would have no counterweight to Amazon's enormously larger market power. The resulting "Amazon always wins" rule cannot possibly be right. 199 Things become clearer when we include price discrimination in the analysis. We have already argued that price discrimination not only improves market efficiency, but also increases profits for those who practice it. This immediately suggests a rule for implementing Judge Cote's "market solution": Let the parties bid for the right to set prices with the winner sharing part of its profit with the losers. 200 Looking back, the real problem with Apple was that the negotiations proceeded almost entirely by threats and coercion. These may well have been antitrust violations. By comparison, letting parties pay for the right to set eBook prices would have facilitated socially beneficial pricing. 201 [
B. Copyright Interventions
Antitrust is not the only way to loosen the Big Five publishers' grip on older titles. Copyright reform can also override suppression. The trick is to leave constructive behaviors in play. In practice, this means nominating someone -big publishers, reprint houses, authors, or government -to override copyright if (and only if) suppression occurs.
Copyright Renewal: Letting Big Publishers Decide
Profs. Landes and Posner have famously argued 202 that publishers can be trusted to discard copyright when books are forgotten. Requiring owners to renew at regular intervals, they claim, would immediately show which companies plan to republish the work. 203 But the Landes and Posner argument does not address copyright suppression, which rewards publishers for renewing copyrights for titles that will never see the light of day. Furthermore, they assume that publishers make case-by-case renewal decisions even though, as we have seen, big 20 th century publishers always renewed all of their titles. Given these objections, indefinite renewal rights would probably pose no more than a de minimis barrier to suppression.
March-In Rights: Letting Small Publishers Decide
The Bayh-Dole Act famously gives government agencies 'march-in' rights to recover unused IP. The trouble is that government -whether for reasons of politics or bureaucratic inertia -seldom invokes them. 204 This suggests that it would be better for Congress to vest march-in rights with parties that have a direct financial stake in asserting them. This could be done letting reprint houses publish any title that has been unavailable for some minimum period of years. 205 Even then, the solution would be clumsy, forcing publishers to bring out new editions solely to preserve their options and raising various drafting issues. 206 202 Landis and Posner, supra at note 5. 203 A secondary objection is that fees and effort spent on renewals are lost to the system and, in particular, do nothing to find and market lost titles. 204 206 For example, a practical statute would need to reject instances where dominant publishers tried to preempt march-in by offering titles at deliberately unaffordable prices. This would raise the usual difficulties for judges trying to define "reasonable prices" without a market. Legislators would also have to decide whether the new right would be exclusive or non-exclusive. The former would restore the "true" copyright incentive but-for suppression. Finally, legislators would have to decide
Reversion: Letting Authors and Heirs Decide
US law already lets authors and heirs reclaim their copyrights after 35 years. 207 However, this gives authors fewer rights to sell to publishers in the first instance and could depress royalties. Courts usually fix this by letting authors waive the right. 208 This traditional difficulty would drop away if Congress created a second right that was only available when a book had been out-of-print for some fixed number of years. For this system to work, however, authors and heirs would still have to find a replacement publisher. Scholars who study so-called "Anticommons" effects have often been skeptical that such licenses can be negotiated where, as here, the expected profits are small. 209 Whether this is right or not depends on why Anticommons effects are claimed to exist in the first place. Conventionally, there are three possibilities. 210 First, game theory predicts that rational negotiators can sometimes increase their share of an eventual payoff by being deliberately unreasonable. But in that case bargainers should actually become more reasonable as the expected profit declines. Second, copyright owners may identify with and overvalue their work. Naively, at least, this bias should be much attenuated for heirs. Finally, business negotiations sometimes fail when parties seek non-financial goals. This also seems unlikely for old titles except, perhaps, where heirs find their ancestors' work embarrassing and seek to suppress it. While these arguments are hardly conclusive, reversion rights are worth a try.
Library Models
Copyright suppression represents a particularly ferocious attempt to stop the emergence of so-called "durable goods" markets in which previously-sold products constrain new goods prices. However, leasing lets producers go on setting prices for both old and new goods indefinitely. 211 The model also has practical precedents: Commercial lending libraries were a pillar of British publishing from the late 18 th to mid-20 th Centuries 212 while companies like Netflix have offered subscription video since the Nineties.
Unlike outright sales, leasing models do not reward suppression. The reason is that subscription becomes more valuable to consumers -and lucrative to sellers -every time the collection grows. At least two companies -Oyster and Scribd -have recently The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 559 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics launched eBook subscription services. 213 This suggests that the market may eventually fix at least part of the suppression problem on its own.
Restoring Used Book Markets
Despite occasional protests, 214 second-hand paper copies never had much impact on new book prices. 215 But used physical books can be unattractive and hard to locate. 216 These drawbacks no longer apply in the Age of eBooks. While current law disfavors resale rights in digital goods, there seems to be no very deep reason for this. 217 Probably the biggest concern is that consumers will resell the same digital content over and over again. This is surely manageable in a world where large sellers already construct tracking systems so that readers can "lend" digital titles to one another. 218 
VIII. REFORMS (B): REVITALIZING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
We have argued that public domain eBook publishers earn too little to support robust search, marketing, or curation efforts. This presents a deep choice between making the commercial publishing system more profitable and replacing it entirely.
A. Commercial Reforms
I began this article by pointing out that society's need to find and market existing titles argues for perpetual copyright. However, this monopoly need not be statutory. Publishers have filled similar gaps with self-help methods since Roman times. 219 
Exclusive Publisher Agreements
The most obvious way to make commercial public domain eBooks more profitable is to limit free entry. There are various ways to do this:
Fixed Fee Access. Platforms like Amazon could charge a fixed fee for each title posted to their site. This option would deliver all profits to the platform and do little for publishers. The situation might still improve, however, to the extent that the platform reinvested at least part of its proceeds in marketing.
Exclusive Rights Auctions. Platforms could let publishers bid for the exclusive right to sell, say, 1,000 public domain titles of their choosing. This would deliver most of the reward to the platform with a small premium for publishers who were unusually successful at finding and marketing titles.
First Come, First Served. Platforms could limit entry to the first two (or five, or seven…) publishers who offered a specific title. This system would leave all of the profits with publishers. 220 Strangely, this might be the platform's best option if bigger marketing budgets expanded the market.
The question remains whether antitrust law permits such schemes. While courts routinely say that firms can refuse to do business with anyone, they invariably add that this power cannot be used for an improper purpose. 221 A more principled analysis starts from the proposition that the publishing markets are highly imperfect so that ancillary restraints are justified. The trouble is that the usual test for Sherman Act violations -does the intervention increase price or reduce output? 222 -is ambivalent. After all, a successful scheme would raise prices and output simultaneously. Still, we have argued that low prices are cold comfort if most readers never finding a deserving title. Our touchstone must therefore be output, not price. 219 Maurer, supra note 3 at 1, 15. 220 The profits are likely to be at least partly dissipated by racing. Amazon would continue to extract profits through its thirty percent royalty on sales. The Economics of Memory: How Copyright 561 Decides Which Books Do (And Don't) Become Classics
Library Models
We have already argued that selling eBooks through subscription download services would reduce copyright suppression. However, the benefits do not end there. Commercial libraries have always delivered consumer value (and justified higher fees) by helping readers find good titles. 223 This incentive rewards discovery even for public domain titles.
Re-Empowering Literary Agents
The modern publishing industry conducts most of its search through literary agents. The obvious problem for public domain books is that the agent does not own her "property." One traditional solution is for publishers and agents to negotiate nondisclosure agreements. However, it could well be sufficient for publishers to offer a fixed finder's fee to whichever agent first identifies a promising title. So long as the publisher pays someone for the suggestion and does not simply pocket the money, agents who do not receive a fee can usually trust the system. 224 Finally, we have seen that metadata can drastically reduce search costs. In order to be effective, literary agents must similarly access search tools. These could be deployed either as an open source-style collaboration or on a commercial, fee-for-search basis.
B. Non-Market Alternatives
We have seen that Gutenberg volunteers already dominate the supply and selection of public domain eBook titles. But in that case, why have commercial publishers at all?
Viral Licenses
We have argued that publishers could find and fix errors much more efficiently by focusing their efforts on a single shared document. As it happens, open source already has a mechanism for doing this: So-called "viral" contracts that require users to donate any improvements back to the community. 225 223 Maurer, supra note 3 at 38. 224 The rub, in practice, is that forced cooperation could reduce commercial publishers' incentives to invest in the first place. This could persuade some publishers to create their own base texts and stop using Gutenberg altogether. Clever collaborations can minimize this effect by letting members delay sharing for commercially-reasonable periods. 226 The deeper problem is that viral licenses ipso facto guarantee that no collaboration member can offer better quality than any other member. 227 This means that even those who remain in the collaboration could invest less effort. Fortunately, this problem already has a well-established solution. Antitrust authorities have long argued R&D joint ventures are not anticompetitive so long as they face at least four comparably strong competitors. 228 
Expanding Gutenberg
Gutenberg's volunteers are already good at finding and digitizing titles. This makes it reasonable to think that existing quality and volume issues could be solved by expanding the collaboration's manpower. It would be natural for the nation's libraries to take up this cause. 229 The deeper challenge is that Gutenberg does very little marketing apart from reporting download statistics. Similarly, crowd-sourced services like Goodreads and Listopia are still in their infancy. For now, are still just collections of reviews -Too numerous, too idiosyncratic, and too conflicting to offer convincing advice. In order to take the next step, open institutions will need to offer a much more coherent product. This might include generating clear, bottom-line recommendations that reliably tell consumers which titles are available and worth reading. 230 Because human taste is heterogeneous, this advice would have to be customized for each user. This could require sophisticated algorithms that analyze how the user had rated known titles in the past and selects reviews by collaboration members that most nearly fit the user's estimated profile.
